Russian Liberals and Obama’s Road to Moscow

Amongst the current tired commentary on Russian affairs, there are two articles, both featured on The National Interest website, that I recommend to readers. I am by no means a Realist in terms of international relations theory, but tend to agree with proponents of that school on the problems with the West’s current stance vis-a-vis Russia.

One is a piece by Anatol Lieven, entitled  ‘Russia’s Limousine Liberals’.  Essentially, Lieven argues that Russian liberals such as Lilia Shevtsova and Garry Kasparov do not take into consideration the interests and opinions of the entire Russian population when they proscribe the need for Russia to become like the West and integrate into the international system on the West’s terms.

Russian citizens’ yearning for the rule of law and stronger democratic processes does not in fact mean that they need to reject the current regime in its entirety. Despite the failings and disappointments of the Putin era, the standard of living (in its most basic, economic form) was raised across the country (is this not the case that the New Labour government in Britain in making in its dying days?). The 1990s failed to demonstrate the benefits to the Russian people of having a President which is a ‘yes man’  to the West’s programme of liberalisation and rejigging of the international order. That illusion simply created a Russian state popular for its rhetoric of nationalism and exceptionalism.

As far as these liberals are concerned, “the only sections of society whose opinions and interests should be of concern to the government are educated, young and dynamic urbanites.” The myth that the Russian middle class will emerge to define the country continues..

Last but not least, Lieven mentions Garry Kasparov, the face of Russian liberalism in the West, whose marginalism in Russian politics has forced him to join a bunch of neo-fascists to have a chance of the voice he so craves. The endorsement that the man seems to receive in Britain and the U.S. simply discredits in the eyes of the Russian people, any liberals who may actually have the capability to make a serious contribution to the future of the country.

The second article is by Gary Hart and Dimitri K. Simes. Entitled ‘The Road to Moscow’, it makes the case for reconsidering the United States’ approach to achieving a level of trust and cooperation with Russia. I will let you read the piece for yourself but I would like to draw your attention to one particular paragraph that caught my attention:

“In the United States, some have foreclosed attempts to work with Russia because it has not become a full-fledged capitalist democracy on the American model quickly enough, the rule of law is too slow in taking root, Moscow is not living up to our norms of human rights, elections are rigged, the media suppressed, economic transactions are not transparent and the list goes on. The question is: are these arguments of sufficient weight to justify resistance to closer U.S.-Russian coordination on issues of strong mutual interest?”

I could not have put it better myself. Of course, should you be an ardent liberal internationalist, you would argue that Russia’s commitments to the above are non-negotiable values upon which a stronger U.S.-Russia relationship must be built. My answer would be – that path died long ago. Not just because many facets of the American model have been discredited but more importantly, because Russia’s national interests cannot be dictated by the West (this is also the case made by Lieven).

Strengthening trust through cooperation based on mutual national interests is the starting place for a future without the outdated stereotypes and misperceptions both today’s Russia and the West seem to lap up.

Russia on the blogosphere and Twitter

Please excuse my lack of posts recently. Unfortunately, witty and insightful commentary on global affairs has not been at the top of my priorities over the past couple of months.

In the meantime, I would like to refer to two blogs that I have recently discovered, which provide both regular and original commentary on Russian politics and culture.

The first is long awaited return of Carl Thomson, who used to run the Kremlinology blog but has now gone all posh and set up his own site named Moscow Tory. I am slightly perturbed by how much I seem to have agreed with those on the Right in recent times. Not that I know how right-wing the Moscow Tory is but I am near total agreement with his nuanced, well written and well thought-out analyses of Eastern European politics.

The other blog worth a read is Siberian Light, whom I must also thank for letting me know that the above blog was up and running. Andy Young, author of the blog, writes on an array of different topics. I particularly enjoy his roundup of other blogs on Russia and funny Youtube clips that you just wouldn’t come across otherwise.

Last but not least, if you are a part of the ever-growing Twitterati, try following Redexile. The man loves to write some random ramblings but his insights as a Brit ex-pat working (in PR/Public Affairs from what I can gather) offers something different from most of the Twitter-tripe.

Gestures and Quid Pro-Quos do not constitute a Resetting of Relations with Russia

Last month’s rapprochement between Hilary Clinton and Sergei Lavrov was extremely encouraging for those who want to see a new epoch of warmer relations and cooperation between Russia and the United States. President Obama should be praised for managing to afford more attention to Russia at a time of global economic crisis and pressing foreign policy challenges in the Middle East and Central Asia, than his predecessor did in his first few months. The importance of ‘resetting’ language should not be underestimated, even if we have already become accustomed to Barack Obama’s new foreign policy discourse of greater understanding, respect and engagement. George Bush and Vladimir Putin may have enjoyed a close personal relationship but the confrontational nature of U.S.-Russia relations was spiralling dangerously out of control, starting with missile defence in Europe and ending with last year’s conflict in Georgia.

Now that a fresh start has been agreed upon, Russia and the U.S. can begin the often neglected, yet important, task of reducing nuclear warheads and renegotiating other arms reductions. A dose of pragmatism is the right way to kick-start cooperation on important global challenges. However, time and again Obama’s foreign policy team have stated that they will not sacrifice American values of democracy and freedom in the pursuit of short term interests. What this will mean for actual policy in the long-term is unclear. Moscow’s response to U.S. overtures will certainly remain lukewarm until Obama actually reverses some of Bush’s initiatives, such as missile defence, rather than merely suggesting so.

The recent leak detailing an alleged quid pro-quo offer in a letter sent by President Obama to his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, sends out a more worrying message – that the expectations of a renewed relationship are unrealistic. American policymakers’ conviction that Russia can help the West by persuading Iran to abandon her ambitions of acquiring a nuclear bomb is fundamentally flawed, as are Russian hopes that Obama will abandon missile defence in Europe and NATO MAP for Ukraine and Georgia. Russia does not have the kind of leverage over Iran that some analysts like to think. Apart from a UN Security Council vote and short term nuclear technical assistance, Russia cannot prevent Iran from acquiring the weapon. However, the important part of the equation, which also influences the Russian stance on European missile defence, is that Moscow does not perceive Tehran as the existential threat that the U.S., Israel and Europe does. Rather, a good relationship with Iran helps Russian ambitions of playing a central role in Middle Eastern and Central Asian affairs.

The danger now is that should Russia not meet Western expectations on Iran, they will be portrayed as uncooperative. Likewise, if European missile defence is not scrapped, Russia will write off the Obama administration. Thus, simple quid pro-quos and Realpolitik will not get us anywhere. Expectations should not be built on the geopolitical specifics but rather the common global threats of nuclear proliferation and climate change. Despite Clinton and Lavrov’s agreement to disagree on certain issues, including Kosovo and Georgia, relations will not be truly reset until a) both sides understand each other’s differing perceptions of global threats, opportunities and challenges and b) both sides find institutions and frameworks through which they both feel comfortable cooperating.

An important test of the U.S. commitment to constructively engage with Russia will be the way it treats the awaited proposals from Medvedev on both a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture and a new energy security treaty. The concrete details and purpose of Russia’s proposals are still unclear, but if they are simply interpreted as attempts to undermine NATO and the OSCE, the message to Moscow will be that ‘Russia must follow our rules’ and that there can be no middle ground. This mentality is a result of mistrust and Russia can certainly do its part to alleviate the problem. But if Obama’s team are prepared to listen, this must also be prepared to understand. As for the Kremlin, they must understand and appreciate the independence of Russia’s neighbours, not simply appear to do so.

Russia’s ties with Latin America and Iran: It’s all about the money

Analysis of Russia’s foreign relations usually focus on the EU-Russia and U.S.-Russia relationships. However, Russia’s strengthening of diplomatic ties with several Latin American countries has caught the eye of Russia-watchers. Throw in Russia’s relations with Iran, particularly in regard to her nuclear ambitions and weapons sales, and the answer seems to be that Moscow is looking to spread its geopolitical influence, thus stacking up a pile of cards which can be stuffed up the sleeve when negotiating with the West.

Well, this is certainly how the proponents of Realpolitik and the Realism school of International relations interpret Russia’s engagement with these countries. The thinking goes that Russia will be cooperative on Iran if the West offers something in return, such as abandoning the European missile defence project. On the other hand, if concessions aren’t made or antagonistic moves are made in Russia’s perceived ‘near abroad’ then she will retaliate by sending warships to the Caribbean. The fact that the likes of Venezuela, Cuba and Iran also happen to be vociferously anti-American further reinforces this point of view.

I understand why this notion of international politics is appealing and more than likely there are influential figures in the Russian military and political elite who also think along these lines. Nevertheless, I interpret the strengthening of relations with these countries as linked more closely to Russia’s need to diversify exports away from oil and gas.  Russia’s problem is that it doesn’t have much it can export. That is where weapons and nuclear technology come in. These constitute two of Russia’s competitive strengths on the global market; not only because they produce them to a fairly high standard but because the likes of Venezuela and Iran cannot buy from every producer of these products.

Russia arms exports hit a record high in 2008, raking in $8.35 billion for Russian arms manufacturers. While this pales in comparison to the revenue obtained from oil and gas, it is sizable for an economy of Russia’s size. The problem is that the largest buyers of Russian weapons of the last 15 years, India and China, are turning to home-made alternatives as the technological gap closes. Therefore, the likes of Cuba and Iran become more important.

Russia’s nuclear know-how and vast quantities of uranium play an even more important role in the current economic and environmental situation. This provides a very useful card up Moscow’s sleeve, as assisting Iran’s nuclear power ambitions has proven. On the one hand, Russia can strengthen her diplomatic relations with Tehran by providing expertise in a clean technology that every nation has right to develop. On the other hand, Russia’s importance to the rest of the world increases as it is perceived as a crucial player in the prevention of nuclear proliferation, even if in reality it could do little to prevent the likes of Iran from acquiring the capability in the long-term. Thus, it is clear that Russia does value the political capital she is afforded due to her position vis-a-vis Iran.

Nevertheless, the Russian elites are ultimately driven by profit motive and are unlikely to sacrifice income from ties with the marginalised nations of global politics. If incentivised financially, their stance may change but in the current economic malaise, don’t expect it anytime soon.

The Discourse on Russian Dissidents

Reading an opinion piece in today’s Independent by columnist Johann Hari has prompted me to write on the dominant discourse regarding the threat posed to Russian dissidents living abroad/in exile.

To be clear, I share Hari’s concern for the plight of these dissidents. The way in which Alexander Litvinenko and others have been brutally murdered is horrifying. However, I am a little concerned about the ease with which he directs blame towards the Russian government and falls into the dominant discourse of equating contemporary Russia with the Soviet Union.

The Russian government is certainly guilty of failing to bring the murderers of Politkovskaya to justice but that is merely one area in which the Russian legal system is inadequate. It is one thing for the Russian government to be uncomfortable receving criticism and quite another for them to pursue an official policy of assasinating dissidents. Hari doesn’t quite seem to see this distinction.

Hari’s perceptions fall line with most of those who lack in-depth knowledge of contemporary Russia – the belief that is a rigid power vertical in Russia and that the state is a rational, unitary actor. Furthermore, Vladimir Putin is identified as the sole source of power, authority and decision-making. This is reflected in two poignant sentences used by Hari:

“To prepare, Putin has restored the Soviet-era criminalisation of dissent. Now, if you “advise” a human rights organisation – merely by speaking to them – you are guilty of “high treason”. More people are going to flee to Europe – and we are going to have to choose between protecting them or letting them be picked off on our streets.”

“If we anger Putin, he can turn off the gas taps, as he has shown with his bullying of Ukraine.”

The danger with this discourse is that it creates a misinformed understanding of the type of world we live in, focusing on historical representations of Russia and ignoring the globalisation of crime and power structures in the Russian elite.

Anyone living in this country must be protected by British police and security services but the world of organised crime is alot murkier and complicated than Johann Hari, me or you could ever imagine.

Time to face the reality of the pipeline fiasco

It appears that the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute has finally come to an end, for this year at least. The proceedings of the dispute have made a full circle, starting with the doomed deal made between Yulia Tymoshenko and Vladimir Putin on New Year’s Eve and ending with a similar deal made between the same two on Sunday. Ukraine will end up paying European market prices for the gas it imports from 2010, receiving a 20% discount for 2009. Russia will pay market rates for the transit of gas to other European customers from 2010, also receiving the same discount. I addition, the murky intermediaries of RusUkrEnergo will be removed from future supply and transit of Russian gas through Ukraine.

Nevertheless, analysts in Brussels, Moscow and Kiev doubt that this is the end of the saga. It is likely that Russia and Ukraine’s diplomatic relations will be strained over a number of political and economic issues, ranging from NATO MAP for Kiev and the future of the Black Sea Fleet’s base in Sevastopol. It is conceivable that these could form the pretext for problems in the supply of gas.

One hopes that the EU has woken up to the reality of the inadequacies in the supply of gas to its 27 member states. Rumour has it that plans for the Nabucco pipeline project will be given renewed vigour. However, simply building new pipelines circumventing Russian territory will not solve the EU’s energy security problems and is a tad premature considering alternative sources of gas from Central Asia and Africa have not yet been secured.

The crisis has confirmed fears of Russia’s unreliability as an EU energy supplier, but not for the politically motivated reasons that many commentators have predicted. Rather, it is because of dependence on transit through Ukraine for 80% of the gas the EU imports from Russia. Therefore it is of paramount importance that alternative pipelines, including Nord Stream and South Stream, get united EU backing. The aforementioned projects have been controversial because of their bilateral dealings between Gazprom and German company E.On in the Nord Stream project; and between Gazprom and Italian company ENI in the South Stream project. The popular narrative is that Moscow prevents EU member states from weaning themselves off Russian gas by playing ‘divide and rule’ – tempting European companies into bilateral deals.

This narrative is both exaggerated and unconstructive. Contrary to this mindset, the EU should welcome alternative routes that can ensure gas supplies to the biggest energy consuming countries. This may only be a short term strategy for dealing with the EU’s huge energy consumption; long-term goals of better efficiency and the import of LNG should not be abandoned. Nevertheless, it is the problematic transit countries such as Ukraine that pose a threat to EU energy security and thus routes for transit should be diversified. Support for both the Nord Stream and South Stream routes would do just that. There is no reason why EU gas supplies should be held hostage as a consequence of Ukraine’s internal political wrangling, corrupt middlemen and bilateral disputes with its Eastern neighbour.

Furthermore, the EU should consider developing the Nabucco pipeline in cooperation with Gazprom, not simply to rival it. This could help with the much needed funding of the project while also ensuring that Russian gas can be pumped through the pipeline until Caspian sources can be secured. It is important to remember that the EU has leverage while Russia depends on the export of gas for a huge part of its income. Moscow has no alternative consumers and the high levels of domestic demand mean that it cannot afford to ‘turn off the taps’.

This proposal should not be interpreted as one that abandons the energy needs of Ukraine and other countries in the EU neighbourhood. Brussels should oblige Russian companies to comply with the rules and norms set out in the Energy Charter. However, Russia is correct to seek market prices for its gas. This should play a part in Russia’s fulfilment of conditions required for ascension to the WTO.

Update: Ben Aris at Business New Europe has written an insightful article about both the benefits of the Nord Stream pipeline and its shortcomings in terms of EU gas dependency. Read here.

EU-Russia Summit: Success for Sarkozy’s Statesmanship?

Sorry for the tongue-twisting title to this blog but it appealed to me as an ample way of describing the differing interpretations of last Friday’s EU summit with Russia.

The talks were resumed in Nice despite protestations from Lithuania and grumbling from Poland that Russia had not yet complied with the six point peace plan requiring Russian armed forces to withdraw from Georgian territory. The commentariat, myself included, were sceptical as to what the summit would achieve other than the symbolic ‘dialogue has been resumed’ press conference. However, Nicolas Sarkozy’s pragmatic diplomacy seems to have created a common ground upon which constructive and productive talks between the EU and Russia can be resumed.

The main points made at the summit were: the EU recognised that Russia had fulfilled the large part of its commitments regarding the ceasefire, withdrawal and deployment of observers in Georgia. Russia was also praised for its conflict resolution efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh. Nevertheless, the EU expressed concern that Russian forces remain in the Akhalgori valley in South Ossetia and the village of Perevi in west Ossetia. Both sides also saw eye-to-eye on the causes and solutions of the financial crises and the need to work towards a common economic area at a time when EU-Russia trade is at its highest.

It was in the security sphere that the French Presidency sprung a surprise through Sarkozy’s backing for Dimitry Medvedev’s proposed pan-European security treaty. Sarkozy seemed so keen to endorse the idea that he suggested approaching the topic next year within the OSCE framework:

“We could meet in mid-2009 to lay the foundations of what could possibly be a future pan-European security system.”

Sarkozy also criticised the US missile defence system, arguing that it “would bring nothing to security in Europe” and that “it would complicate things”.

These two comments imply that the French President is singing from the same sheet of future European security as Medvedev. Perhaps Sarkozy read my article for the Foreign Policy Centre from earlier this year and liked what he read!

Sceptics claim that Sarkozy is naive to back this Euro-Atalantic security pact, as it is merely a means for the Kremlin to undermine NATO and the OSCE while gaining a stake in rewriting the international norms of peace, security and co-operation.

I agree that Russia wants to realign international norms with their values and vision of the new global order. However, there is also a strong desire to ‘come in from the cold’ after the negative publicity following the Georgia saga. It is this that Sarkozy has latched onto as a means of getting Russia to co-operate with the EU.

I have a twofold interpretation of Sarkozy’s conciliatory approach towards Russia. My first interpretation is that Sarkozy empathises with Russia’s demands to play a greater role in setting the global political agenda, as this correlates with his DeGaullist strategy for France. Sarkozy wants France to have a seat at the high table of international diplomacy and sees Russia as playing a role in a new, more multi-polar world order that can replace the unipolar era of American dominance.

The second interpretation is that Sarkozy is again being pragmatic in dealings with Russia, as he was in the aftermath of the Georgia conflict. The French President realises that the EU has little leverage over Russia economically or militarily but also understands that the EU’s cooperation and support is something that Russia greatly values at a time of isolation following the unilateral use of force and unilateral support for Abkahzian and South Ossetian independence.

The backing for Medvedev’s security pact does not mean much beyond a commitment to simply raise the topic either within the OSCE framework or at the next NATO-Russia meeting. But his support for the Russian proposal indicates that the EU takes Russia’s security concerns seriously enough while simultaneously preventing the Russians from crying that its European neighbours do not take its point of view seriously. The onus is now on Medvedev to cooperate with the EU and EU diplomats will hope that the hand of the Kremlin hawks will be weakened. This creates the policy space for the mutually beneficial economic negotiation to continue and the rhetoric fuelled accusation to be put aside.

While Sarkozy may share some of Medvedev’s hopes at replacing the NATO security framework with something that leaves little room for the Americans in Europe, he will not be pushing for the closing down of the cold-war architecture anytime soon. If Russia’s aims are cynical, they won’t be delivered. But if creating a new, more inclusive treaty makes Russia feel more secure and thereby act more responsibly, this initial rapprochement could prove to be a diplomatic masterstroke.

Mr Sarkozy defended his conciliatory diplomacy towards Russia since August, saying: “Those who sit down and talk are not the weakest but the strongest.” This is exactly what you would expect the small man to say, however credit where credit is due – Nicolas has scrapped the rhetoric and found a way to get Russia to act in Georgia as well as allegedly stopping Vladimir Putin from hanging Mikhail Saakashvili from the balls. It’s a shame other statesmen have been trying for years to no avail (and no, I’m not talking about Saakashvili’s balls).

Contrasting implications of an Obama or McCain presidency on U.S. relations with Russia

As the U.S. election-day nears and her relations with Russia occupy a much higher place on the foreign policy agenda than in previous years, we find ourselves wondering what form America’s relations with Russia will take.

The first of the presidential debates, held on Friday 26th September, revealed nothing new and showed little divergence between Obama and McCain in their opinions towards Russia, apart from McCain accusing Obama of failing to condemn the Kremlin in the immediate aftermath ofthe conflict with Georgia – “He doesn’t understand that Russia committed serious aggression against Georgia”. Obama replied that this was in-fact untrue and accordingly threw in some rhetoric to demonstrate his hardline credentials.

Obama proceeded to have a pop at Bush’s relationship with Vladimir Putin:

“But we have to have a president who is clear that you don’t deal with Russia based on staring into his eyes and seeing his soul. You deal with Russia based on, what are your — what are the national security interests of the United States of America?”

This foreign policy language of ‘realism’ and pragmatism, suggests that Obama, unlike McCain, has not put all of his eggs in one basket regarding relations with Russia. I have had the benefit of hearing a key Obama Russian foreign policy adviser in person state that the White House should be careful not to isolate Russia as a nation, even if that is what they may wish to do to the Kremlin and its political stooges. I was also told that the opportunity for Russia to join NATO or a future as-of-yet unknown security organisation should not be ruled out, that incentives for Russia to integrate must remain on the table.

Obama’s running mate, Joe Biden, has been an outspoken critic of Russian domestic and foreign policy, including failure to uphold its commitments to the 1999 OSCE Summit and commenting that that Russia’s invasion of Georgia ‘may be the one of the most significant events to occur in Europe since the end of communism’. Nevertheless, Biden hasvast experience of U.S. relations with Russia as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and realises, like Obama, that there are many issues upon which a cordial relationship with Russia depends.

My feeling is that U.S. stance towards Russia under Obama would be based on the principles that have been a cornerstone of his approach to foreign policy – engagement, understanding, a return to a belief in diplomacy. The Obama advisor told an audience including myself that the U.S. need not make a choice of whether to pursue a foreign policy based on values or interests, and rather that the two should be synonymous. In reality this means continuing support of the ex-Soviet states’ right to join NATO and building alliances with aspiring liberal democracies. This sounds like the perseverance of foreign policy based on the export of the liberal-democratic model that we have been accustomed to from Washington for the past few decades.

Despite the harsh rhetoric towards Russia that is a prerequisite for any potential U.S. presidential candidate, at least the Democrats are not attempting to close doors and have a set of nuanced Russia advisers  (such as Michael McFaul and Celeste Wallander) behind the scenes. The McCain campaign is far more worrying, you simply have to take a look at the people he has round him.

First off there is Sarah Palin (who appears to be more of liability to McCain’s campaign by the day), the potential VP who claims to have an insight (I dare not say expertise) into Russian affairs, primarily because of Alaska’s proximity to the country. That really is clutching at straws.

Then there is Randy Scheunemann, McCain’s top foreign policy adviser that received a tidy sum from Tbilisi through a lobbying firm he partly owns, to provide strategic advice from Washington. An article in the Washington Post is particularly revealing:

As a private lobbyist trying to influence lawmakers and Bush administration staffers, Scheunemann at times relied on his access to McCain in his work for foreign clients on Capitol Hill. He and his partner reported 71 phone conversations and meetings with McCain and his top advisers since 2004 on behalf of foreign clients, including Georgia, according to forms they filed with the Justice Department.

The contacts often focused on Georgia’s aspirations to join NATO and on legislative proposals, including a measure co-sponsored by McCain that supported Georgia’s position on South Ossetia, one of the Georgian regions taken over by Russia this weekend.

Now, it is nothing new for lobbyists to have such influence over a presidential candidate. However, if you consider Scheunemann’s presence alongside fellow neocons William Kristol and Robert Kagan, there has to be concern that the McCain camp has a rather narrow and biased view of the threat Russia poses and the means of achieving a more mutually conducive relationship.

Kaganhas managed to evoke a comparison between Putin and Hitler in the aftermath of the Georgia conflict, which according to Godwin’s law, should automatically delegitimise his argument. I tend to see the McCain camp as having firmly closed the door on a constructive relationship with Russia, opting for containment and isolation of Russia while simultaneously supporting states in the former-Soviet space. Even former Republican Secretaries of State and foreign policy advisers, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, have warned the McCain that he is playing a dangerous game stoking up confrontation with Russia:

“This drift toward confrontation needs to be ended.”

“However appropriate as a temporary device for showing our concern, isolating Russia is not a sustainable long-range policy. It is neither feasible nor desirable to isolate a country spanning one-eighth of the earth’s surface, adjoining Europe, Asia and the Middle East, and possessing a stockpile of nuclear weapons comparable to that of the United States.”

Obama’s approach holds more hope for Europeans on a number of foreign policy issues, although it is probably a mistake to assess his stance as friendly towards Russia.

Obama’s lack of foreign policy experience could be better for starting a new relationship with Russia, as he is not tainted by the Cold War mindset that comes naturally to McCain as a consequence of his personal experiences. There will not be the same tendency to see Russia as synonymous with the Soviet Union, which will be critical if Obama intends to fulfil his promise of change in the way the world sees the U.S. and vice-versa. Nevertheless, it is likely that Obama will pursue America’s perceived national security interests through NATO expansion and missile defence in Europe. Therefore, continuing conflict with Russia over these issues are likely to continue.

As I have argued in the past, in the unpredictable and chaotic world of international politics, the ability to change negative pre-conceptions and begin a new relationship through soft diplomacy can have a powerful effect. By character and policy, Obama is better placed to embrace this strategy than McCain. In the interest of a safer, stable multi-polar world, I know where my vote would go.

The Russia-Georgia fallout: post-conflict questions

Readers of this blog will have noticed that I have not written a post for the past couple of weeks, coinciding with a period of time that could not have played more significance to the direction of Russia’s relations with the U.K., Europe, the West and the wider world. Although I was on holiday during this period, my real reasons for not having posted a blog on the fallout from the Russian conflict with Georgia over South Ossetia arise from my desire not to make premature speculations or analysis that would fall into the polarised blame game that has filled the pages of the international print media.

Aside from the sympathy I have for those people’s lives in South Ossetia and Georgia that have been taken or ruined, there are two consequences of the conflict that have been of most disappointment to me. Firstly, I have been dismayed by the anti-Russian bias in the British media which has merely strengthened the cause of the hawks and ultra-nationalists within the Russian political arena. Some newspapers have been worse than others. Carl Thomson over at Kremlinology blog highlights the inability of the Daily Telegraph to give an unbiased account. More than anything else, I am disappointed by the failure on the part of the media to discuss the irresponsibility of Saakashvili’s actions and the consequences it should have on Georgia’s relationship with the West.

Secondly, my sympathy for Russia’s position has declined rapidly following the Kremlin’s inappropriate claims of genocide and ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia, as well as the hypocrisy that it has demonstrated by unilaterally recognising the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although assertions of Western double standards may have some value, Russia certainly has no right to criticise following its actions over the past week.  

Rather than post a long-winded piece analysing the conflict which will merely be lost amongst the saturated print and broadcast media and blogosphere, I would like to raise some questions that have not been covered thus far. Over the coming weeks, the post-conflict developments will come to the fore, starting with the EU emergency summit tomorrow. Hopefully, I and others will be able to provide the answers to some of the following issues:

·         Speeches and statements from policymakers from both sides of the Atlantic are adamant that Russia will be held accountable for their actions in Georgia. But what exactly does this entail? There isn’t many apparent ways in which either the E.U. or the U.S. can hurt Russia without provoking a reaction which will in-turn hurt their interests.

·         Will Georgia be held accountable for its own actions towards South Ossetia? Or will these simply be excused on the premise that they were provoked by Russia?

·         Can Georgia be a reliable partner within both the E.U. and NATO while it has a hothead president, Saakashvili, who has deviated from the supposedly democratic principles that was his ticket to power and U.S. sponsorship?

·         What will be the consequences of Russia’s new found support for the self-determination of peoples and ambivalence towards the sovereignty of other states? Will they be able to build a consistent set of foreign policy values?

·         Medvedev claims that Russia is ready for a new cold war, despite the desire to avoid one. Does Russia cease to care about Western perceptions following the tirade of criticism it has recently faced?

·         Can the E.U. have a united and constructive relationship with Russia while its Eastern European members maintain their understandable fear and mistrust?

·         The power of PR. How was Georgia able to strike such a decisive victory in the battle for perceptions? Do the constant equivocations with Prague 1968 mark the success of a ‘new cold war’ discourse?      

Furthermore, I will re-address my last article about the need to be open-minded about relations with Russia. Although political realities will dictate that relations between Russia and the West will remain frosty for the forseeable future, I still believe that the case I made is relevant in the post-Georgia conflict climate.

The need to be open-minded about Russia’s approaches

The past year has seen more disputes between Russia and the West than at any other time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the Kosovo crisis to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it has been extremely difficult to achieve a consensus over the most pressing global challenges. In recent months, tension increased over NATO expansion into former Soviet territory, failure to agree on sanctions directed at Zimbabwe and U.S. plans for anti-missile defence bases in Eastern Europe. Despite disappointment over the failure of both sides to see eye-to-eye regarding these matters, the frustrations over Russia’s apparent ‘assertiveness’ should not translate into a rejection of her role in global affairs. In order to overcome the disagreements, negotiation must prevail through comprehension of Russia’s perspective, as opposed to the confrontational rhetoric and calls for punitive measures endorsed by Senator John McCain.

The Republican presidential candidate recently repeated his threat to eject Russia from the G8, claiming “We want better Russian behaviour internationally, and we have every right to expect it”. This condescending language from McCain is particularly alarming as it reflects a belief that the U.S. ‘lost’ Russia at the end of the 1990s and that the only way to regain her compliance is through punishment. If this line is pursued by the international community, it will merely push Russia into a stronger strategic partnership with China, or worse still – isolation from European security and cooperation entirely. Furthermore, confrontation will play into the hands of those Russian hawks that portray the West’s every move as a threat and encourage the nation to assert itself through tit-for-tat political manoeuvring and economic protectionism.

Russia’s use of a UN Security Council veto on the vote for Zimbabwean sanctions may well indicate that the country will continue its assertiveness in global affairs, even when the issue bears no direct relation to Russia’s geostrategic interests. At the turn of the millennium Russia would have simply abstained from the Zimbabwe vote, whereas now it wants to make the case clear, along with China, that interference in another state’s affairs will not be tolerated. In the short term this will frustrate attempts by the E.U. and the U.S. to legitimise and promote humanitarian intervention through the U.N. However, cooperation with Russia on global security and economic challenges should not be sacrificed in order to make a stand over a difference in political values. Russia’s importance in implementing nuclear weapon non-proliferation agreements is a case in hand.

The recent Russian proposal for a Euro-Atlantic Security Treaty has been unfairly dismissed by some analysts as merely an attempt to undermine NATO. Undoubtedly, Russian political elites would like the Cold War era security treaty to be dismantled and thrown into the dustbin of history, but this should not discredit the idea entirely. NATO has attempted to rebrand itself several times since 1991 in order to justify a) a heavy U.S. military presence in Europe, and b) enlargement eastwards. Despite statements that the organisation’s mandate is now to face 21st century global threats such as terrorism and transnational crime, there has been a failure to convince the Kremlin that its long term aim is not in fact to confront the Russian threat in some distant future.

Although the proposal for an EATO may not be a viable in its current form, in principle it should be considered, as it demonstrates an attempt by the new president, Dmitry Medvedev, to provide a constructive solution for the “21st century realities” confronting all countries in the “Euro-Atlantic space from Vancouver to Vladivostok”. There is a demand for a security pact which can both ensure the independence of states in Central and Eastern Europe, while also assuaging Russian insecurities. Such an organisation should also address the failures of the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty, which was made redundant not only through Russia’s failure to remove troops from Transnistria and Georgia, but also by the potential for an unbalanced build up of armed forces along Russia’s border in favour of NATO member states based on Cold War calculations.

The critics of Russia’s new foreign policy concept argue that the country’s political elite merely seek to create new organisations to avoid compliance with what they see as Western-imposed values of political freedom, human rights and the rule of law. Although there is some truth in this view, if there is anything that we have learned from the past 17 years of relations with Russia, it is that the West has little direct influence over her political system and path of development. These pretensions must be abandoned in favour of partnerships on the economic and security front. Engagement in these areas will engender further openness from Russia and subject her to diverse political influences from across the globe.

Dmitri Trenin, commentator on Russian affairs, posits that “America and Europe need to look at Russia as an emerging capitalist society, rather than failed democratic polity”(1). The positive sign is that Russia is pursuing its national interests primarily through the instruments of the globalised world currently in place. Locking Russia into economic and security interdependence will foster the strongest links. In order to ensure that Russia will abide by international law, particularly in relations with her ‘near abroad’ and within global energy markets, time must not be lost in signing Russia up to the WTO and a new European Partnership Agreement. These will set in stone a mutually beneficial, rules-based mechanism for future engagement. The longer Europe and the U.S. deliberate on the matter, the louder the voices questioning engagement with the West will become in Russian politics. Isolation of Russia will simply compel a more aggressive pursuit of her interests, including the use of energy as a political weapon.

Russia must also play its part, starting with a change in its paranoid Cold War-era perceptions of America’s role in European security. Nevertheless, the early signs of Medvedev’s foreign policy are of a strong desire to build a business-like relationship with Europe and the U.S. He has demonstrated more tact than his predecessor in business-related matters as foreign investment and expertise are vital to the country’s development. However, NATO enlargement and missile defence will continue to be vehemently opposed by the Kremlin and wider Russian public.

Europe and the U.S. should welcome Russia’s desire to play a constructive role on the world stage by listening, negotiating and show a willingness to commit, along with Russia, to a new framework for a stable, multi-polar world order. This could kick start a more positive era of relations with Russia. If the West simply rejects Russia’s advances, like in the early 1990s, we may kill President Medvedev’s chances of shaping a new foreign policy before it can make an impact on the country’s self-image and perceptions of the outside world.

(1) Dmitri Trenin, Getting Russia Right’ (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 2007), pg. 112.

This article is also on the Foreign Policy Centre website.